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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper considers educational investment, wages and hours of market work in an 
imperfectly competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and home production.  
It investigates the degree to which there might be both underemployment in the labour 
market and underinvestment in education.  A central insight is that the ex-post 
participation decision of workers endogeneously generates increasing marginal returns to 
education.  Although equilibrium implies underinvestment in education, optimal policy is 
not to subsidise education.  Instead it is to subsidise labour market participation which we 
argue might be efficiently targeted as state provided childcare support. 
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1 Introduction
This paper considers educational investment, wages and hours of market work in an imperfectly
competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and home production. It investigates the
degree to which there might be both underemployment in the labour market and underinvestment
in education. A central insight is that the ex-post participation decision of workers endogeneously
generates increasing marginal returns to education. This non-convexity can result in a large dis-
continuity in educational choice and labour market participation across workers. The paper shows
that for some workers, a competitive labour market would imply they invest significantly in edu-
cation and participate with a high probability in the labour market. But wages below marginal
product (in a non-competitive labour market) and increasing returns to education together imply a
non-marginal switch to low educational investment and home production. These large substitution
eﬀects yield large welfare losses and so corrective taxation plays an important role. Although there is
underinvestment in education, optimal policy is not to subsidise education. Instead it is to subsidise
labour market participation, which we argue might be eﬃciently targeted as state-provided childcare
support.
The paper considers a hold-up problem where in the first phase of their lives, youngsters increase
their future workplace ability by investing in general skills. Those investments are made prior
to becoming employed in the workplace. Clearly some skill investments, such as primary school
education in literacy and numeracy skills, are invaluable both in the home and in the workplace.
But the focus here is on educational choice past the compulsory school level, by which time literacy
and numeracy skills have presumably been well honed. Instead students might further invest in a
university degree in mathematics or a qualification in information technology, imbuing them with
expertise that is valuable in the workplace but is unlikely to increase their skills in the home.
A central feature of the model is that there are increasing marginal returns to education. We
stress that these increasing returns do not arise because we assume a Mincer wage equation with
increasing returns. Indeed the arguments are consistent with a Mincerian wage rate w = a + e
where the wage rate w depends on endowed ability a and is linearly increasing in education e. But
such a wage equation does not describe the marginal return to education. For example, the person
who intends to specialise entirely in child rearing and home-making has a zero financial return to
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investing in workplace skills, regardless of the size of the Mincer wage eﬀect. The marginal return
to education depends both on the Mincer wage eﬀect and expected labour supply, where increased
labour supply implies human capital investments are “used” more intensively in the workplace. We
shall show there are three reasons for increasing returns to education. First, there are increasing
marginal returns to education because of a participation eﬀect. More highly skilled workers earn
higher wages in the workplace and so are more likely to participate in the workplace, thereby raising
the ex ante expected returns to human capital investment. Second, increasing returns arise through
an increasing labour supply eﬀect, where more educated workers may find it worthwhile to work longer
hours. But with a frictional labour market there is a third reason for increasing marginal returns to
education - an increasing wage competitiveness eﬀect. We show that firms bid more competitively
for the worker’s services as the value of employment increases. As wage compression decreases at
higher productivity levels, the marginal return to education increases as education increases.
A second important feature of the paper is that it assumes workers have diﬀerent productivities
both at home and in the workplace. We introduce this assumption not only because it is realistic,
although that is clearly an advantage.1 But more importantly, it allows us to demonstrate how
expected home productivity aﬀects optimal educational choice and labour supply, where home and
workplace productivities vary across individuals. Specifically we show that the deadweight losses that
arise through an imperfectly competitive labour market are not equally spread across all workers.
Increasing returns to education coupled with an imperfectly competitive labour market generates an
“under-participation trap”. If the labour market were competitive, then workers in that trap would
choose a high level of education and high expected labour supply in the workplace. But because the
labour market is not competitive and so wages paid are below marginal product, they substitute
instead to home production. The increasing returns to education, however, imply the substitution
eﬀect is non-marginal for workers in this “trap”. Instead they make very low skills investments ex
ante, and participate with low probability in the labour market ex post. This large substitution
eﬀect implies a correspondingly large deadweight loss.
1High returns to home productivity might be realized by those involved with care of young children or elderly
parents, or for individuals with a taste for leisure or for home renovations, or for those with a strong aversion to
workplace employment. For childless households, non-participation might be associated with pure leisure, although
time use studies do show that - even in households without children - considerable time is devoted to home-related
activities such as cooking and cleaning.
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The next section describes the model and Section 3 determines equilibrium remuneration and
participation rates of workers by productivity type. Section 4 examines the worker’s optimal invest-
ment decision and Section 5 develops the implications for optimal childcare policies. We establish
that a participation subsidy, paid to the worker, not only corrects the ex-post under-participation
problem, but also corrects the ex-ante under-education problem.
2 The Model
Each individual is productive both at home and in the workplace. A representative person is born in
the first period with ability a and has expectations of future home productivity b. In the first period,
the individual at cost φ(k) can acquire k units of general human capital, whereupon the worker’s
second period productivity in the workplace is α = a + k. Assume φ is continuously diﬀentiable,
strictly convex and φ(0) = φ0(0) = 0. The discussion section considers a more general specification
where higher ability types can become more productive at lower marginal cost; i.e., φ = φ(a, k)
with marginal cost ∂φ/∂k decreasing in a (and so education and ability are complementary inputs
in productivity). We shall show that this variation makes little material diﬀerence to the results.
A useful simplifying assumption is that human capital investment k does not aﬀect second period
home productivity b. Again in the discussion section we describe what happens if, in addition, skills
investment k increases home productivity. The results presented below hold as long as the eﬀect
of skills investment on market productivity, α, is suﬃciently large relative to its impact on home
productivity b. For ease of exposition, however, we assume for now that home productivity is fixed.
In the second period, the worker has a unit time endowment which is allocated between time
spent in home production (h) and in the workplace (l), so that h+ l = 1. Note that home production
can also be interpreted as leisure. There are diminishing marginal returns to home production. If
the worker allocates time h to home production, assume the value of home output is bx(h) where
x(.) is increasing, diﬀerentiable and concave with x(0) = 0.
There are constant marginal returns to labour in the workplace; a worker with workplace pro-
ductivity α who supplies l units of labour to the workplace generates revenue αl. One could instead
assume diminishing marginal returns to labour, but if the worker’s output is small relative to the
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scale of the firm, the constant returns assumption seems a reasonable approximation. The critical
ingredient for what follows is that this revenue function R = αl exhibits increasing returns to scale in
productivity and labour supply. As this is an important feature of the model, it is worth discussing
it a little. For example in the competitive case, one typically assumes given wage rate w, the worker
earns income E = wl by supplying l hours to the market. A Mincer type wage equation, where wage
w = w(a, k) depends on education k, then implies earnings E = lw(a, k). Even if there are dimin-
ishing returns to education in wages (i.e. w is concave in k) note that earnings E = lw(a, k) exhibit
joint increasing returns with respect to labour supply and education k. It is this non-convexity
which is fundamental to the results. One interpetation is that increased labour supply implies hu-
man capital investments are ‘used’ more intensively. For example zero labour supply implies zero
human capital usage, and the marginal return to education is then zero regardless of the magnitude
of the Mincer wage eﬀect ∂w/dk.
The market failure is a hold-up problem: the worker invests in human capital in the first period,
and wages are determined in the second period in an imperfectly competitive labour market. One
modelling approach would be to specify an equilibrium search framework where wages are determined
by Nash bargaining (e.g. Pissarides (2000)) or by wage posting with on the job search (e.g. Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)). In those frameworks, equilibrium implies
workers ex post earn less than their marginal product and the hold-up problem implies each worker
ex ante underinvests in skills. But given our focus on optimal labour market policy, the monoposony
framework as described in Bhaskar and To (1999) provides a simpler equilibrium framework. Like
the Nash bargaining approach, the Bhaskar and To (1999) framework implies equilibrium wage
compression; that wages need not increase one-for-one with an increase in labour market productivity.
The central advantage to the Bhaskar and To (1999) framework, however, is that we need not specify
matching functions, free entry conditions etc or describe equilibrium wage dispersion. The policy
discussion is consequently clearer, as there are neither thick market nor congestion externalities to
complicate matters.
In contrast to Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) who assume Bertrand wage competition between
firms should an employee receive an outside oﬀer, Bhaskar and To (1999) assume workers have
idiosyncratic preferences over employment at diﬀerent firms, and those preferences are private infor-
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mation. Thus a firm’s wage oﬀer depends on how much he/she believes the employee prefers working
there rather than elsewhere. Bhaskar and To (1999) cite various empirical studies supporting the
assumption that workers have heterogeneous preferences for non-wage characteristics. Bhaskar et al
(2002) further note that this assumption can usefully summarise the variety of reasons for imper-
fect competition in the labour market. Specifically equilibrium implies a firm oﬀers a wage below
marginal product, where the firm’s trade-oﬀ is between oﬀering an even lower wage and an increased
probability that the worker chooses to work elsewhere.2
The assumed market structure is analogous to a Hotelling pricing game with n ≥ 2 competing
firms.3 Consider a representative worker who is characterised by productivities (α, b) which are
observed by all firms.4 Firms diﬀer in their nonpecuniary attributes, such as geographical location
and other nonwage job characteristics. Workers have heterogeneous preferences where the more
distant are the i-th firm’s characteristics from the worker’s preferred characteristics, the larger is the
worker’s disutility cost ci associated with employment at that firm. Note that this cost ci is a fixed
cost to working at firm i and is analogous to a transport or commuting cost.5 The representative
worker’s employment preferences ci, i = 1, .., n are private information and considered as i.i.d. draws
from c.d.f. F . Assume F is twice diﬀerentiable and its density is decreasing over its support [0, c];
i.e., F is concave. Each firm i simultaneously makes a contract oﬀer (yi, li), where yi is the amount
paid to the worker in return for providing li units of labour time. Given those contract oﬀers, the
worker either accepts one, say at firm i, and so obtains period 2 utility U2 = bx(1 − li) + yi − ci,
or rejects all and so obtains period 2 utility U2 = bx(1) through home production. Note the worker
is risk neutral in consumption. Should the worker accept firm i’s contract oﬀer, firm i makes profit
αli − yi, while the other firms obtain zero profit.
Throughout we shall only consider symmetric pure strategy equilibria. In the second period and
given (α, b), each firm i oﬀers contract (yi, li) to maximise expected profit. The symmetric Nash
2 In Burdett and Mortensen (1998) with on-the-job search, a lower wage also increases the quit rate of the worker.
But given the asymmetric information friction adopted here, we simplify by assuming no search frictions.
3Our approach thus diﬀers from labour supply theory with exogenously given market-wage rates. Important
contributions to the literature considering the allocation of time to home production - albeit in a diﬀerent context to
ours - include Becker (1965), Gronau (1977) and Apps and Rees (1997).
4 Inferences on home productivity b might be based on age and gender, though we abstract from such issues here.
5Although one could instead specify a disutility cost cil, where that loss is proportional to the amount of time spent
working at the firm, this would then introduce screening issues - a firm posts a menu of contracts where part-time
employment contracts are targeted to workers with high ci and full time contracts for those with low ci. The transport
(fixed) cost approach adopted here abstracts from such issues.
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equilibrium implies all oﬀer the same contract (y∗(α, b), l∗(α, b)). Given those equilibrium contract
oﬀers in the second period, the worker in the first period computes expected second period utility,
denoted U∗2 (α, b). The worker then invests in skills k to maximise U
∗
2 (α(a, k), b)− φ(k).
In anticipation of the results, it is useful to define the competitive benchmark where the market
wage rate equals marginal product; w = α. Let V denote the value of employment in that case
V (α, b) = max
l∈[0,1]
[αl − b[x(1)− x(1− l)]] ,
which is the (maximised) value of earnings net of foregone home production. As the worker prefers
pure home production if ci > V for all i, the worker’s participation probability in a competitive
labour market is
P (V ) = 1− [1− F (V )]n.
Conditional on labour market participation, let l∗(α, b) denote the optimal labour supply decision;
i.e.
l∗(α, b) = arg max
l∈[0,1]
[αl − b[x(1)− x(1− l)]] .
and note that the Envelope Theorem implies l∗ = ∂V/∂α. Claim 0 describes their basic properties.
Claim 0. Characterisation of V, l∗.
(i) l∗ = 0 and V = 0 for α ≤ bx0(1);
(ii) l∗ ∈ (0, 1) and V > 0 are both strictly increasing in α and strictly decreasing in b for
α ∈ (bx0(1), bx0(0));
(iii) l∗ = 1 and V = α− b[x(1)− x(0)] for α ≥ bx0(0); .
Claim 0 follows from standard optimisation theory. We shall refer to α = bx0(0) as the full time
margin and productivities α ∈ [bx0(0),∞) as the full-time employment region, noting that l∗ = 1
is optimal for such α. We shall refer to α = bx0(1) as the part-time margin, and the interval
(bx0(1), bx0(0)) as the part-time employment region as l∗ ∈ (0, 1) is optimal for such α. Note that
α ≤ bx0(1) implies there is no gain to trade as home productivity strictly dominates workplace
productivity.
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3 Equilibrium Wages
Given the set of contract oﬀers {(yi, li)}i=1,..,n and idiosyncratic utility costs ci, the worker’s second
period payoﬀ is
U2 = max
i=1,..,n
{bx(1− li) + yi − ci, bx(1)}
where the worker either accepts one firm’s oﬀer or rejects all. This section characterizes the (sym-
metric, pure strategy) Nash equilibrium where each firm i simultaneously makes a contract oﬀer
(yi, li) to maximise expected profit, given the job acceptance strategy of the worker.
As productivities are observed, each firm’s optimal contract oﬀer implies li = l∗. Given the set
of optimal contract oﬀers, {(yi, l∗)}i=1,..,n, the worker’s optimal job acceptance strategy is to accept
employment at firm i if
yi − ci + bx(1− l∗) > max
j 6=i
{yj − cj + bx(1− l∗), bx(1)}
Note that firm i faces two margins: a participation margin and a poaching margin. The participation
margin requires that the job oﬀer must fully compensate for foregone home production; i.e. the
worker considers firm i’s oﬀer only if yi−ci > b[x(1)−x(1− l∗)]. The poaching margin requires that
firm i’s oﬀer is also preferred to all other wage oﬀers; i.e. yi − ci > yj − cj for all j 6= i. Theorem 1
now describes the symmetric Nash equilibrium to this contract posting game.
Theorem 1. Equilibrium Contract Oﬀers.
For any (α, b) with V > 0, a pure strategy, symmetric contract-posting equilibrium implies each
firm oﬀers contract (y∗, l∗) where
y∗ = b[x(1)− x(1− l∗)] + s∗
with s∗ = s∗(V ) given by
1
n
[1− [1− F (s∗)]n] = [V − s∗]
"
[1− F (s∗)]n−1f(s∗) + (n− 1)
Z s∗
0
[1− F (c1)]n−2[f(c1)]2dc1
#
. (1)
Proof is in the Appendix.
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The equilibrium wage oﬀer, y∗, fully compensates the worker for foregone home production and
oﬀers additional surplus s∗. The worker participates in the labour market (i.e. accepts a job oﬀer)
if and only if y∗− ci+ bx(1− l∗) > bx(1) for at least one i, which is equivalent to ci < s∗ for at least
one firm. Hence the above equilibrium wage oﬀers imply the worker’s participation probability is
P (s∗) = 1− [1− F (s∗)]n.
The equilibrium surplus oﬀered, s∗ as defined in (1), depends on V, the value of employment, and on
the number of competing firms. As n becomes arbitrarily large, competition between firms implies
s∗ converges to V and equilibrium converges to the competitive case. However, for finite n, firms
shave those oﬀers so that s∗ < V. The equilibrium choice, described by (1), reflects the standard
monopsony trade-oﬀ between lower wage oﬀers and lower employment. Optimality requires that
these two margins are equal. The left hand side of (1) is the probability of employment (given by
P (s∗)/n) and describes the marginal loss in profit should, say, firm 1 oﬀer slightly more surplus
than the equilibrium oﬀer. The right hand side describes the marginal increase in firm 1’s profit by
making a more attractive oﬀer which increases the probability the potential employee will accept it.
The first term in square brackets on the RHS, f(s∗)[1−F (s∗)]n−1 , is the measure of workers who are
marginally attracted from non-participation, that is, workers whose c1 = s∗ and cj > s∗ for j 6= 1.
The second term is the measure of workers marginally poached from a competing firm j, where the
worker is indiﬀerent between accepting firm 1’s oﬀer and a firm j0s oﬀer (that is, c1 = cj < s∗ and
ck > c1 for k 6= 1, j), and where this state potentially occurs with each of the n− 1 competing firms.
Also note that (1) describes the optimal contract oﬀer with pure monopsony, where n = 1, and there
is no poaching margin.
The critical feature for what follows is that the equilibrium contract oﬀer implies both wage
compression and underparticipation in the labour market.
Claim 1. s∗(V ) is increasing and continuously diﬀerentiable in V with:
(i) s∗ = 0 at V = 0;
(ii) ds∗/dV < 1 and s∗(V ) < c for V ∈ (0, c+ d),
9
(iii) s∗(V ) = V − d for V ≥ c+ d where
d =
1
n(n− 1)
R c
0
[1− F (c)]n−2f(c)2dc
. (2)
Proof is in the Appendix. Notice that d can be thought of as a measure of labor market stickiness,
as described for example in Stevens (1994).
It can be shown that the same properties of s∗ occur when F is only log concave; i.e. when
F 00F < F 02, but the proof is both long and tedious.6 Formally the equilibrium outcome described in
Theorem 1 corresponds to an n-buyer first price auction, where the seller has private independent
match values. Although assuming F is concave (or log concave) is suﬃcient to guarantee non-
paradoxical comparative statics; i.e. more productive workers receive higher wage oﬀers, establishing
that a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium necessarily exists is less straightforward. The Technical
Appendix describes the formal existence problem. In what follows, we simply assume a symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium exists.
Section 4 describes optimal investment in the first period given workers anticipate contract oﬀers
as described in Theorem 1. Those results depend critically on the following market failures.
I. Equilibrium Wage Compression.
Imperfect competition in the labour market implies firms oﬀer surplus s∗ < V. Claim 1 establishes
at low workplace productivities, where 0 < V (.) < c + d, that ds∗/dV < 1. Following Acemoglu
and Pischke (1999) we describe this outcome as wage compression; that is, wage oﬀers do not
increase one-for-one with workplace productivity. An important feature for what follows is that
wage compression disappears at high enough levels of workplace productivity. In particular, Claim
1 implies
(i) there is wage compression for (α, b) satisfying V < c+ d as ds∗/dV < 1 in that region, while
(ii) there is no wage compression for (α, b) satisfying V > c+ d as ds∗/dV = 1.
To understand why there is no wage compression at high V , recall that a firm faces two
6Establishing that 0 < ds
∗
dV < 1 in (9) in the Appendix requires showing
[1− F (s∗)]n−1f(s∗) + [V − s∗][1− F (s∗)]n−1[−F 00(s∗)] > 0
where s∗ is defined by (1). Using (1) to substitute out (V − s∗) it is possible, but tedious, to show that log concavity
of F , which implies FF 00 < F 02, is suﬃcient to imply the above inequality at s∗.
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oligopsony margins: a poaching margin and a participation margin. By oﬀering higher wages, a firm
might not only attract an employee from a competing firm - the poaching margin - but also attract
a non-participant into the market sector.
The participation margin does not bind for workers with suﬃciently high V that, in equilibrium,
they accept a job oﬀer with probability one. As noted above, a useful analogy is the Hotelling pricing
literature where we might interpret ci as the worker’s transport cost to work at firm i. The case “V
suﬃciently high that an oﬀer is always accepted” is typically referred to as a “covered market”. The
equilibrium is that all firms oﬀer a wage equal to the worker’s value of output less “price” d > 0.
Equilibrium d reflects the marginal probability that a small increase in the oﬀered wage will poach
the worker away from the competing firms and, in a symmetric equilibrium, d depends only on the
number of competing firms and the distribution of transport costs. The lump-sum deduction implies
there is no wage compression.
In contrast, the participation margin binds for workers with V less than c + d. Such workers
include low workplace-productivity workers and intermediate productivity workers with high home
productivities. An important property of the Hotelling pricing structure is that, as the value of
employment increases, wage competition at the margin becomes more intense. In particular, (9)
in the Appendix implies ds∗/dV = 0.5 at V = 0, ds∗/dV < 1 for V < c + d and ds∗/dV → 1 as
V → c+ d. Hence wages rise more quickly with productivity as the participation margin peters out,
where ds∗/dV = 1 for all V ≥ c+ d.
II. Equilibrium Underparticipation
The worker’s participation probability is P (s∗) = 1−[1−F (s∗)]n. Given the competitive outcome
would imply s∗ = V, Claim 1 implies:
(i) there is underparticipation for (α, b) satisfying 0 < V < c+ d as P (s∗) < P (V ) with P (s∗) < 1,
while
(ii) there is eﬃcient participation for (α, b) satisfying V > c+ d as P (s∗) = P (V ) = 1.
The underparticipation problem arises as worker preferences or disutility costs ci are not observed
and firms oﬀer less than full surplus. If the value of workplace productivity is suﬃciently high,
however, that the worker participates with probability one, then the privately optimal participation
decision coincides with the socially optimal one.
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4 The Worker’s Optimal Education Decision
To identify the privately optimal investment decision in the first period, Claim 2 now computes
expected second period utility, which is denoted U∗2 (α, b).
Claim 2. For any (α, b) and oﬀers as described in Theorem 1:
U∗2 (α, b) = bx(1) +
Z s∗
0
[1− (1− F (c))n] dc. (3)
Proof is in the Appendix.
Expected second period utility equals the option value of home production plus the expected
surplus from employment, which depends on V = V (α, b) and labour market imperfections, as
s∗ = s∗(V ).
In the first period, given ability a and expected home productivity b, the worker’s optimal
investment decision solves:
max
α≥a
U∗2 (α, b)− φ(α− a)
where the worker chooses second period productivity α ≥ a at investment cost φ(k), where k = α−a.
The necessary condition for a maximum is
∂U∗2 /∂α = φ
0(α− a),
i.e., the worker sets the marginal return to education equal to its marginal cost, where (3) implies
the marginal return to education, denoted MR, is
MR ≡ ∂U
∗
2
∂α
= [1− (1− F (s∗))n]ds
∗
dV
∂V
∂α
= P (s∗)
ds∗
dV
∂V
∂α
. (4)
Note, MR depends on three components: P (s∗) is the probability the worker participates in the
labour market; ds∗/dV is the rate at which oﬀered compensation s∗ increases with V ; and ∂V/∂α
describes how V increases with productivity α.
In a competitive labour market with earnings function E = αl, the Envelope Theorem would
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imply marginal return to education ∂E/∂α = l∗, which is simply expected labour supply. The
above expression is more complicated as there are labour market imperfections. Nevertheless the
interpretation is the same. The definition of V and the Envelope Theorem imply ∂V/∂α = l∗.
Hence [P (.)][∂V/∂α] together describe expected labour supply. The marginal return to education is
expected labour supply times the marginal increase in wage through higher productivity.
Figure 1 plots MR (with b fixed).Most importantly for what follows, note that there are increasing
marginal returns. This occurs for three reasons:
(i) Participation eﬀects: an increase in productivity implies firms oﬀer better wages which in-
creases the worker’s participation probability; i.e. P (s∗) increases as α increases. The higher par-
ticipation probability increases directly the marginal return to education.
(ii) Increasing labour supply: ∂V/∂α equals l∗ and as an increase in workplace productivity
implies an increase in labour supply l∗ (Claim 0), this further increases the marginal return to
education.
(iii) Increasing wage competiveness: as the value of employment V increases, firms at the margin
bid more competitively for the worker’s services. In particular, ds∗/dV = 0.5 at V = 0, while
ds∗/dV → 1 as V → c + d (see Claim 1); i.e. wage compression decreases at higher productivity
levels.
To plot MR (given b) define the eﬃciency frontier α = α(b) where
V (α, b) = c+ d
and note Claim 0 implies α is strictly increasing in b. Also note that V (α, b) ≥ c+ d if and only if
α ≥ α(b). The above implies the following results:
(a) MR = 0 for α < bx0(1) [Claim 0 implies l∗ = V = 0 in this region and so P (s∗) = 0].
(b) the slope of MR is zero at α = bx0(1);
(c) suppose c is relatively large; specifically b[x0(0)− [x(1)− x(0)]] < c+ d. This implies that a
person at the full time margin, one with productivity α = bx0(0), has value of employment V < c+d
and so does not necessarily participate in the labour market. It follows that α(b) > bx0(0) as drawn
in Figure 1 and so MR = 1 for α ≥ α(b).
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Figure 1 here.
AlthoughMR is continuous, its slope is not continuous at the full time margin (where α = bx0(0)).
In particular, labour supply l∗ ≡ ∂V/∂α is strictly increasing in α in the part-time employment
region, where increasing labour supply generates increasing returns to education [see (ii) above].
At the full time margin, however, labour supply becomes constrained l∗ = 1 and this source of
increasing returns stops discontinuously at that point.
φ0(α − a) is the marginal cost to skill accumulation and is denoted MCa in Figure 1. The
assumptions on φ imply MCa = 0 at α = a and is strictly increasing in α. The optimal skills
investment decision of a worker with ability a occurs where MCa crosses MR. As demonstrated
in Figure 1, there may be multiple intersections - the middle one describes a minimum, the other
two describe local maxima. We now determine which of those local maxima describe the global
maximum.
Consider the interesting case of a person of ability type a = aM , as drawn in Figure 1. Because
the two shaded areas are equal, this person is indiﬀerent to investing to α = α2 > bx0(0) or investing
to α = α1 < bx0(0). Now consider an increase in ability a > aM . This implies the MCa curve shifts
to the right (and so marginal cost falls) while MR is unchanged. Thus workers with ability a > aM
strictly prefer the right-side maximum and so train where α > α2 > bx0(0). Such workers have
high V ex-post, have relatively high participation probabilities and work full time (choose l∗ = 1).
In contrast a decrease in ability a < aM implies the MCa curve shifts to the left (and marginal
cost rises) and so lower ability types strictly prefer the left-side maximum. Such workers train to
α < α1 < bx0(0), they have low V ex-post, low participation probabilities and will only consider
part-time employment. Increasing returns to education therefore leads to discontinuous investment
decisions across ability aM .
To see that this discontinuity generates large deadweight losses, consider the optimal investment
and participation decisions in a competitive labour market. Recall that the private marginal return
to investment is
MR = P (s∗)
ds∗
dV
∂V
∂α
= P (s∗)
ds∗
dV
l∗.
As previously explained, the competitive outcome implies s = V and so the social return to educa-
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tion, denoted SR, is
SR = P (V )
∂V
∂α
= P (V )l∗ (5)
which is expected labour supply. Hence MR < SR if there is underparticipation, P (s∗) < P (V ), or
if there is wage compression ds∗/dV < 1.
It follows that MR = SR at very low productivities, where α < bx0(1), in which case V = 0
and so MR = SR = 0 (there is no gain to trade). It also follows that MR = SR for very
high productivities, where α > α(b), as there is eﬃcient participation and no wage compression.
For intermediate productivities, however, we have MR < SR due to underparticipation and wage
compression.
Figure 2 here.
Note, both MR and SR have a zero slope at the part-time margin, and both have discontinuous
slopes at the full-time margin. Claim 1 implies SR > MR for all α ∈ (bx0(1), α(b)].
Recall that the worker with ability aM is indiﬀerent between investing to α1 or α2. The shaded
area describes the deadweight loss associated with the low investment decision. The socially optimal
decision is that the worker invests to αs. If the worker invests to α2, the resulting deadweight loss
corresponds to the Harberger triangle labelled DWL2 in Figure 2. If the worker instead invests to
α1, the large substitution eﬀect implies deadweight loss DWL1 which is clearly much larger.
Increasing returns to education and an imperfectly competitive labour market can therefore lead
to an under-participation trap. Workers with ability a < aM invest in skills where α < α1. Having
low V, they have low participation probabilities, and only participate in part-time employment (if at
all). But the socially optimal decision for these workers may be that they invest to skills αs > bx0(0)
and participate in full time employment with a high participation probability. The discontinuity in
investment behaviour leads to a large deadweight loss.
Figure 1 describes aM for a particular value of home productivity b. More generally for any b, let
(aM , b) denote the worker who is indiﬀerent to investing to high α and working full-time, or investing
low α and working part-time with a low probability. As the value of employment V depends on b,
then aM varies with b. The following characterises aM = aM (b).
An increase in b does not aﬀect the MC curve. Now consider how an increase in b aﬀects the
MR curve. First note that a (small) increase in b implies an increase in α(.) and a right shift in the
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part-time and full time margins. Second, fix an α ∈ (bx0(1), α(b)). A (small) increase in b implies
lower labour supply l∗ (strictly lower in the part-time region), strictly lower V (Claim 0) and as
P (s∗) < 1 in this region, MR falls in this region. Figure 3 draws two MR curves, denoted MR, MR0
corresponding to two diﬀerent home productivities b, b0 with b < b0.
Figure 3 here.
An increase in b to b0 implies a fall inMR as drawn in Figure 3. The marginal worker as depicted
in Figure 1, the one with ability a = aM (b) and home productivity b, now strictly prefers to choose
low skills α < α1 should home productivity increase to b0 > b. Hence aM (b0) > aM (b); i.e. the
undeparticipation trap is increasing in home productivity. It also follows that if home productivity
is suﬃciently small that aM < 0, then the underparticipation trap disappears.
Of course, the above applies if the marginal cost curve, MCa, is relatively flat. If the marginal
cost curve is steep enough, then the part-time employment trap does not exist. Figure 4 depicts this
case.
Figure 4 here.
As in the previous cases, the investment and participation decisions are distorted for those
with intermediate ability. Those with very low workplace ability and high home productivity do
not invest in general human capital and focus purely on home production. Those with very high
workplace ability invest fully in skills, where MC = 1, and participate with a high probability
in full time employment. The imperfect labour market distorts market behaviour for those with
with intermediate participation probabilities. Although there are increasing marginal returns to
education, a steep marginal cost curve (implying education choices are inelastic relative to endowed
ability) implies relatively small substitution eﬀects and the eﬃciency loss corresponds to standard
Harberger triangles.
5 Discussion
It is well known that an imperfectly competitive labour market may lead to wage compression and
underinvestment in general human capital.7 A key insight here is that it also leads to underpartic-
ipation which acts as a multiplier eﬀect - lower participation rates lower still further the marginal
7See for example Stevens (1994) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999).
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return to education.8 Further, with heterogeneous workers and increasing returns to education, the
corresponding welfare losses are largest for a particular subset of workers - those with high work-
place ability a but whose home productivity is also relatively high, and so an imperfectly competitive
labour market leads to a large substitution to home production. For workers in the “underpartic-
ipation trap” the eﬃcient outcome (in a competitive market) implies large investments in human
capital and high participation rates in the labour market. But as they do not receive the full return
to those investments, they instead substitute to home production — they make low skills investments
and participate with low probability in the labour market.
5.1 Extensions
Before turning to optimal policy we first discuss two variations on the model. The first relates to
the cost of skills acquisition. Suppose that the cost of education is now φ(k, a) where marginal cost
∂φ/∂k is decreasing in a and ∂φ/∂k = 0 at k = 0 as before. Thus higher ability types can accumulate
greater skills at lower cost. Note then that an increase in ability implies MCa not only shifts to the
right, it also falls. But the overall eﬀect is qualitatively identical to that already considered and so
does not aﬀect the insights.
The second variation relates to the assumption that home productivity b is independent of k.
Relaxing this has less innocuous implications. Suppose that b = b(k) and is an increasing function.
Note that, given (α, b) in the second period, Claims 1 and 2 continue to hold. The expected marginal
return to training in the first period, however, is now given by:
dU∗2 (α, b)
dk
=
∂U∗2 (α, b)
∂α
dα
dk
+
∂U∗2 (α, b)
∂b
db
dk
as home productivity also increases with k. Noting that dα/dk = 1 by assumption and that the
Envelope Theorem implies ∂V∂b = −[x(1)− x(1− l∗)], we obtain
MR = P (s∗)
ds∗
dV
∂V
∂α
+
∙
x(1)[1− P (s∗)ds
∗
dV
] + x(1− l∗)P (s∗)ds
∗
dV
¸
db
dk
(6)
8The approach of Acemoglu (1996) is quite diﬀerent. In that model, while firms have constant returns to scale
production functions, an interaction between ex ante human capital investments and bilateral search results in social
increasing returns to average human capital. In contrast, we explicitly allow for home production and therefore
capture the possibility of under-participation and wage compression generating mutually reinforcing eﬀects on human
capital investments.
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Note the second term is positive (as 0 ≤ P (s∗), ds∗dV ≤ 1) and so, if home productivity is strictly
increasing in k, this further increases the marginal return to education. We have already established
the first term yields increasing marginal returns. The second term is ambiguous. If for example b(k)
is suﬃciently large that P (s∗) = 0, then b00 < 0 implies decreasing marginal returns to education. As
such types do not participate in the labour market, the only eﬀect of education is its impact on home
productivity. But it would appear reasonable to assume that university level degree schemes have a
larger impact on potential earnings in the workplace than on one’s capabilities as a home-maker. If
b0(k) is relatively small, the first term dominates in (6) and the insights obtained above go through.
5.2 Policy
Optimal policy requires increasing the return to participation in the labour market relative to non-
participation. The obvious approach is either to (i) tax non-participants with a home production
tax, or (ii) subsidise participation. The first approach - a tax on non-participation - is unlikely to
be politically feasible and so we focus on the latter.
Suppose the government observes the worker’s productivity parameters α, b and oﬀers an em-
ployment subsidy x = x(V ) to workers who participate in the labour market, where V = V (α, b) as
defined before. Repeating the analysis as before and given x ≥ 0, it is straightforward to show that,
in a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium surplus oﬀered by firms is s∗(V + x)− x.
In other words, the firms extract the employment subsidy from the worker (the −x term), but the
equilibrium oﬀer then reflects that the value of workplace employment is V + x. Given such oﬀers,
workers obtain net surplus s∗(V + x).
To identify the optimal subsidy, note that the competitive outcome implies s = V. Hence imple-
menting the competitive outcome implies optimal employment subsidy, x∗, where
s∗(V + x∗) = V.
This condition identifies the optimal employment subsidy. It follows from the Implicit Function
Theorem and (1) in Theorem 1 that x∗(0) = 0, x∗(.) is strictly increasing for V < c+ d, and x∗ = d
for V ≥ c+ d.
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Thus guaranteeing eﬃcient participation and eﬃcient education requires an employment subsidy
paid to workers. An education subsidy, in contrast, is inappropriate. Of course for many types the
welfare gains through subsidising particpation may be small. Indeed the welfare gain is zero for
high ability types who invest in large amounts of education and participate in the labour market
with probability one. Instead as clearly demonstrated in Figure 2, the welfare gains are largest for
those who are caught in the “underparticipation” trap. In the uncorrected market, these workers
are characterised by relatively high home and workplace abilities, but they choose low education
ex ante and have low labour market participation rates. It is well known from empirical studies
using European data that women with children at home are characterised by low participation rates
and relatively low education levels (see Petrongolo (2004) and references therein). This suggests
that individuals most likely to be caught in the “underparticipation trap” are young women who
expect to have children. An obvious employment subsidy which targets precisely this group is a
state-subsidised childcare scheme, where childcare payments are made conditional on employment.
Such a subsidy potentially generates large welfare gains, for it not only corrects the ex-post un-
derparticipation distortion but also encourages women to invest more in education when young. 9
6 Conclusion
It is surprising that the increasing returns argument presented here has received no attention in
the profession. Possibly it has been missed as there are decreasing marginal returns to labour
supply and, given labour supply, there are also decreasing returns to education. Of course this does
not imply a concave programming problem as there are joint increasing returns. When decisions
are sequential, as in the hold-up problem considered here, these joint increasing returns generate
increasing marginal returns to education in the first period. We have shown that, in an imperfectly
competitive labour market, increasing returns to education generate an under-participation trap.
Optimal corrective policy is an employment subsidy, which we argue might be eﬃciently targeted
as a public childcare program.
9For empirical estimates of the excess demand for subsidised childcare places by mothers of small children, see for
example Wrohlich (2005) and the references surveyed therein.
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A popular alternative model of an imperfectly competitive labour market assumes instead search
frictions and that wages are determined by Nash bargaining. In particular given (α, b) and free
entry of firms, the axiomatic Nash bargaining approach would imply the firm negotiates profit π
and labour supply l as
max
π,l
[π]1−γ [αl − π + bx(1− l)− bx(1)]γ
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the worker’s bargaining power, bx(1) is the worker’s threatpoint [i.e. the value of
home production] and the firm’s threatpoint is zero in a free entry equilibrium. By definition of V
in the text, this reduces to
max
π
[π]1−γ [V − π]γ
and Nash bargaining implies worker remuneration y∗ satisfies dy∗/dV = γ. As in Claim 1, this
implies equilibrium wage compression and so one would anticipate the same eﬀects on education
and particpation as discussed here. But there are two main advantages to the Bhasker and To
(1999) approach. One is that it rules out search externalities, such as thick market and congestion
externalities, which would otherwise complicate the policy discussion. It also does not require
solving for the steady state distribution of job seeker productivities which, in equilibrium, aﬀects
the vacancy creation decision of firms. The simpler approach shows clearly that underparticipation
and wage compression generate mutually reinforcing distortions on human capital investment: wage
compression implies workers tend to underinvest in workplace skills, and lower skills imply a lower
participation probability which further reduces the expected return to human capital accumulation.
In currently ongoing work we examine how increasing returns to education interact with various
other market distortions such as (i) endogenous household formation with matching frictions in the
marriage market (Booth and Coles, 2005); and (ii) government tax policy, where increasing returns
to education causes large substitution eﬀects, and hence large deadweight losses, around the non-
participant margin (Booth and Coles, 2006a). In a third paper, we show that increasing returns to
education arise even in a perfectly competitive labour market (Booth, Coles and Gong, 2006b) and
identify these eﬀects empirically using individual-level data.
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7 Technical Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
Consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms post contract (y∗, l∗). Suppose firm 1 considers
a deviating (but optimal) contract (y1, l∗). Given the worker’s optimal job acceptance strategy (as
defined in the text), firm 1’s expected profit by oﬀering y1, denoted π1, is
π1 = P (y1 − c1 ≥ max
j 6=1
[b[x(1)− x(1− l∗)], y∗ − cj ])[αl∗ − y1],
where P (.) is the probability that the worker accepts firm 1’s job oﬀer,10 whereupon the firm makes
profit αl∗ − y1.
To compute this probability, note that for each c1 satisfying y1 − c1 ≥ b[x(1) − x(1 − l∗)]; i.e.
for c1 ≤ y1 − b[x(1) − x(1 − l∗)], the worker prefers employment at firm 1 rather than pure home
production. Further for such c1, the worker also prefers firm 1’s employment oﬀer to firm j0s oﬀer
as long as y∗ − cj ≤ y1 − c1; i.e. as long as cj ≥ y∗ − y1 + c1 which occurs with probability
10As there are no mass points in F, by assumption, we can assume a weak inequality.
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1 − F (y∗ − y1 + c1). Hence integrating over such c1, the probability the worker accepts firm 1’s
contract oﬀer is
Z y1−b[x(1)−x(1−l∗)]
0
[1− F (y∗ − y1 + c1)]n−1f(c1)dc1.
Hence firm 1’s expected profit is
π1 = [αl∗ − y1]
Z y1−b[x(1)−x(1−l∗)]
0
[1− F (y∗ − y1 + c1)]n−1f(c1)dc1.
Now define s∗ = y∗ − b[x(1)− x(1− l∗)] and so
y∗ = b[x(1)− x(1− l∗)] + s∗.
y∗ is decomposed as full compensation for foregone home production plus additional surplus s∗.
Similarly define s1 = y1 − b[x(1) − x(1 − l∗)]. Substituting out y1, y∗ in the above and using the
definition of V (α, b), firm 1’s profit reduces to
π1(s1, s∗;α, b) = [V − s1]
Z s1
0
[1− F (s∗ − s1 + c1)]n−1f(c1)dc1 (7)
with V = V (α, b). Hence given s∗, firm 1’s best response for s1 is defined by the first order condition
∂π1/∂s1 = 0 where the above implies
∂π1
∂s1
= −
Z s1
0
[1− F (s∗ − s1 + c1)]n−1f(c1)dc1 (8)
+[V − s1]f(s1)[1− F (s∗)]n−1
+[V − s1]
Z s1
0
(n− 1)
£
f(s∗ − s1 + c1)[1− F (s∗ − s1 + c1)]n−2
¤
f(c1)dc1.
A pure strategy, symmetric equilibrium requires firm 1’s best response s1 = s∗, and so the above
condition implies
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Z s∗
0
[1− F (c1)]n−1f(c1)dc1 = [V − s∗]f(s∗)[1− F (s∗)]n−1
+[V − s∗]
Z y∗
0
(n− 1)[1− F (c1)]n−2f(c1)2dc1
is a necessary condition for a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium. The left hand side is integrable
and this equation simplifies to (1). This completes the proof of the Theorem.
Proof of Claim 1. (1) immediately implies s∗(0) = 0. Diﬀerentiating (1) w.r.t. V and rearranging
yields:
ds∗
dV
=
[1− F (s∗)]n−1f(s∗) + (n− 1)
R s∗
0
[1− F (c)]n−2f(c)2dc
2[1− F (s∗)]n−1f(s∗) + (n− 1)
R s∗
0
[1− F (c)]n−2f(c)2dc+ [V − s∗][1− F (s∗)]n−1[−F 00(s∗)]
(9)
Putting s∗ = V = 0 implies part (i).
Noting V > 0 implies s∗ < V [a firm never oﬀers s∗ > V as it implies a negative profit] then F
concave over its support implies 0 < ds
∗
dV < 1 while 0 < s
∗ < c. As F is twice diﬀerentiable, ds∗/dV is
continuous for s∗ < c and note s∗ → c− implies ds∗/dV → 1. Putting s∗ = c in (1) implies V = c+d
where d is defined in the Claim. Finally (1) implies s∗ = V − d for s∗ ≥ c. This completes the proof
of the Claim.
Proof of Claim 2. Theorem 1 implies
U∗2 (α, b) = Eci max[bx(1), y
∗ − ci + bx(1− l∗)]
= bx(1) +Eci max[0, s
∗ − ci].
Let c = min[c1, c2, .., cn] and note this random variable has c.d.f. G = 1− (1− F )n. As
U∗2 (α, b) = bx(1) +
Z s∗
0
[s∗ − c]dG(c),
integration by parts now implies the claim.
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The Existence Problem.
Each firm oﬀers a wage which fully compensates for home production and oﬀers additional surplus
s∗ which depends on the value of workplace employment V . To address the existence issue, suppose
each firm j 6= 1 announces s∗and suppose firm 1 deviates by announcing s. Let
L(s, s∗) =
Z y
0
[1− F (s∗ − s+ c1)]n−1f(c1)dc1
which is the probability the worker accepts firm 1’s job oﬀer. Hence
π1 = L(s, s∗)[V − s].
Note that π1 ≡ 0 for s ≤ s∗ − c (as L = 0) and π1 ≤ 0 for s ≥ V. Hence define Γ(V ) =
[max[0, s∗− c], V ] ⊆ [0, V ] where s∗ = s∗(V ) is defined by (1). Note that Claim 1 implies s∗ ∈ Γ(V )
and so Γ is non-empty. Without loss of generality we can restrict attention to s ∈ Γ(V ) - all other
oﬀers yield negative profit. As π1 is not concave in s over this domain, a suﬃcient condition for
existence of a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium is that π1 is single peaked; i.e. that at any
s ∈ Γ(V ) where ∂π1/∂s = 0, then ∂2π1/∂s2 < 0. Using the above definition of π1, a suﬃcient
condition is that
L
∂2L
∂s2
− 2∂L
∂s
2
< 0 for all s ∈ Γ(V ). (10)
Given the definition of L, (10) describes a restriction on F which guarantees existence of a symmetric,
pure strategy Nash equilibrium (where Claim 1 implies s∗ always exists). Unfortunately computing
these terms yields long and unwieldy expressions. Although the restriction to F log concave (or the
stronger condition that F is concave) guarantees sensible comparative statics, we have been unable
to show it is suﬃcient to guarantee single peakedness as defined in (10).
It is well known in the Hotelling framework with linear transport costs that pure strategy equi-
libria may not exist. The problem there is that demand is discontinuous - a small price cut can
imply a jump in demand. Such demand discontinuities do not arise here - idiosyncratic match values
imply demand L(.) is continuous in s. We believe the pure strategy symmetric equilibrium exists
when F is log concave but have not been able to prove this formally.
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Figure 1: Discontinuous Investment Choices 
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Figure 2: Deadweight Losses 
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics on Home Productivity 
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Figure 4: Non-Existence of a Part-Time Employment Trap 
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